The philosophy of science is a field philosophy and it traditionally studies three families of problems.
1. General problems of science
a. Epistemological problems of science
(i.e. What is the criteria of scientific approach? Is only one type of ‘scientificness’ possible? Can there be any other foundation of a scientific theory than the sensual experience? How reliable is induction? Can a probability of a state of facts (an eventuality) really be measured, or only a probability of a logical possibility (a necessity) can be calculated? What is verification and to what extent can it verify?)
b. Metaphysical problems of science
(i. e. Does scientific theory reveal reality? What is ‘objectivity’? How do contexts exist? What is ‘explanation’ after all? Do the conceived beings really exist /i.e. subatomic particles, ego, financial market, freedom/?)
c. Ethical problems of science
(i.e. Where are the limits of a scientist’s responsibility regarding dangerous research and dangerous applications? Is the limitation and prohibition of research in certain questions allowable or compulsory /i.e. religious miracles, racial differences, alive autopsy/?)
2. Problems of the connections between scientific fields
(i.e. Is a unified scientific theory and science that connect every scientific field possible? Is there an essential difference between natural and social sciences? Can sciences ultimately be reduced to one fundamental science? What makes a scientific field autonomous and what makes an interdisciplinary science autonomous?)
3. Problems of scientific key concepts
(I.e. What is ‘time’, ‘space’, ‘energy’, ‘matter’, ‘cause’, ‘reason’?)
1. General problems of science
a. Epistemological problems of science
(i.e. What is the criteria of scientific approach? Is only one type of ‘scientificness’ possible? Can there be any other foundation of a scientific theory than the sensual experience? How reliable is induction? Can a probability of a state of facts (an eventuality) really be measured, or only a probability of a logical possibility (a necessity) can be calculated? What is verification and to what extent can it verify?)
b. Metaphysical problems of science
(i. e. Does scientific theory reveal reality? What is ‘objectivity’? How do contexts exist? What is ‘explanation’ after all? Do the conceived beings really exist /i.e. subatomic particles, ego, financial market, freedom/?)
c. Ethical problems of science
(i.e. Where are the limits of a scientist’s responsibility regarding dangerous research and dangerous applications? Is the limitation and prohibition of research in certain questions allowable or compulsory /i.e. religious miracles, racial differences, alive autopsy/?)
2. Problems of the connections between scientific fields
(i.e. Is a unified scientific theory and science that connect every scientific field possible? Is there an essential difference between natural and social sciences? Can sciences ultimately be reduced to one fundamental science? What makes a scientific field autonomous and what makes an interdisciplinary science autonomous?)
3. Problems of scientific key concepts
(I.e. What is ‘time’, ‘space’, ‘energy’, ‘matter’, ‘cause’, ‘reason’?)
The autonomous and systemic scientific philosophy separated from the philosophy of logics and epistemology in the 20th century, although previous times also had their own conceptions of scientificness.
1st phase (from the beginnings to the 4th century B.C.)
1st phase (from the beginnings to the 4th century B.C.)
| purpose: task: leading science: method: result type: character of knowledge: | surviving to know the future, to know time astrology observation, description, record universal order, universal logics (e.g. Dharma, Tao, Logos) mystical, divine gift, god-serving |
2nd phase (4th century B.C. - 16th century) Aristotle
| purpose: task: leading science: method: result type: character of knowledge: | economic power technology, engineering, applications physics experiment, induction, empiricism laws, rules, formulae public, polyhistoric, economy-serving |
4th phase (middle of 19th century – 1970s) Gottlob Frege
| purpose: task: leading science: method: result type: character of knowledge: | political power general problem solving algorithm, approach patterns mathematics, cybernetics, informatics formalization, quantification, functional analysis model, phraseology special, partial, scientific-industry-serving |
5th phase (1970s - ) Thomas Kuhn
| purpose: task: leading science: method: result type: character of knowledge: | cultural power contextualization (narration research, narration control) biology, chaos research, space technology systems theory, anomaly research methodology anarchistic, pragmatic, collective, technocracy-serving |
Instead of curiosity and compassion, the scientific-technical development as a social phenomenon is still being motivated by power struggle and mainly by wars. The scientific-technical development was ignited at the time of the European-Ottoman, and the Catholic-Protestant wars, when the family-scale battles were replaced by mass armies and by the clash of civilizations and cultures.
It is also the time when the West starts to surpass the East. This is the time when army-supplying civic enterprise becomes a serious business, which provides an even better motivation to the accumulation of capital and to investments than Protestant Ethic itself. It is from this time that the power rewards, finances, and defends the scientific achievements even against itself (i.e. against Inquisition). Besides climatic and demographic reasons, it was mass production (the basis of mass warfare) that played a significant role in the civil progression leading to the era of Renaissance, Rationalism, and Enlightenment. Agriculture, industry, and management supplying and equipping fleets and armies required professionalism, experience, rationality, and ultimately scientific-technical development. The competition of power struggle ignites a scientific-technical competition from the 16th century.
The intense kick-off of the interests of natural science and engineering was no coincidence and until today it is the military interests that decide the most important directions and proportions of scientific research and technical developments. We have been witnessing the spectacular and uninterrupted development of natural and technical sciences ever since. It is no wonder that this circumstance also dominates the concept of ‘scientificness’.
The debates about ‘scientificness’ became especially intense from the second half of the 19th century. By this time it was obvious that the scientific-technical revolution did not live up to the expectations.
The all brand new public opinion created by handouts and journalism was already divided in the question of criticalness. On one side stood the uncritical natural sciences that were fully satisfied with their own performance and their autocracy, while lined up on the other side were the dissatisfied church - being beaten but already preparing for the rematch - and the social sciences that were born from the political demands of the critiques of society and science. The moral, political, and methodical credibility of science were all present in their debate at the same time. There have been several rounds, but the fight still goes on.
It is also the time when the West starts to surpass the East. This is the time when army-supplying civic enterprise becomes a serious business, which provides an even better motivation to the accumulation of capital and to investments than Protestant Ethic itself. It is from this time that the power rewards, finances, and defends the scientific achievements even against itself (i.e. against Inquisition). Besides climatic and demographic reasons, it was mass production (the basis of mass warfare) that played a significant role in the civil progression leading to the era of Renaissance, Rationalism, and Enlightenment. Agriculture, industry, and management supplying and equipping fleets and armies required professionalism, experience, rationality, and ultimately scientific-technical development. The competition of power struggle ignites a scientific-technical competition from the 16th century.
The intense kick-off of the interests of natural science and engineering was no coincidence and until today it is the military interests that decide the most important directions and proportions of scientific research and technical developments. We have been witnessing the spectacular and uninterrupted development of natural and technical sciences ever since. It is no wonder that this circumstance also dominates the concept of ‘scientificness’.
The debates about ‘scientificness’ became especially intense from the second half of the 19th century. By this time it was obvious that the scientific-technical revolution did not live up to the expectations.
The all brand new public opinion created by handouts and journalism was already divided in the question of criticalness. On one side stood the uncritical natural sciences that were fully satisfied with their own performance and their autocracy, while lined up on the other side were the dissatisfied church - being beaten but already preparing for the rematch - and the social sciences that were born from the political demands of the critiques of society and science. The moral, political, and methodical credibility of science were all present in their debate at the same time. There have been several rounds, but the fight still goes on.
‘First Round’: science against religion (from the 16th century)
The collaboration of Empiricism and Rationalism overthrows the religious approach by the end of the 18th century. Francis Bacon replaces the axiomatic-deductive method (which is based on fundamental principles and relies on metaphysics) of scholasticism and Aristotle with the empirical-inductive method (which is based on experiences and quantities, and dismisses metaphysics). The corresponding and publishing natural sciences develop their networks and academies. The debate of ‘scientificness’ commences between the Anglo-Saxon empiricists and the continental rationalists. Within their joint victory the criticism of the socially and politically more sensitive continental enlightenment proves more powerful – mainly because of Kant and Hegel.
‘Second Round’: natural science against social science
(from the 2nd half of the 19th century)
From the middle of the 19th century - after the death of Hegel – the criticism of the axiomatic-deductive method becomes defenseless and fails, and the empiricist-inductive approach of the natural scientific positivism (i.e. Darwin, Huxley) becomes superior in the academies and scientific clubs. Natural science becomes sensational and popular. Showing interest towards it is highborn and fashionable. Both politically and morally it is assertively ‘neutral’, therefore it is useful for the state power for many reasons. Two kinds of criticisms emerge against its power: religious criticism that restored its own workshops and returned to scientific debates (i.e. Pope Leo XIII), and scientific criticism, namely social scientific positivism that emerged from political dissatisfaction (i.e. Comte, Marx). Religious criticism aims to rehabilitate the deductive method, while social and human sciences attempt to create the synthesis of the induction/deduction debate. All three contextualize each other: natural science regards everything as natural phenomena, religion regards everything as religious phenomena, and social science regards everything from a social perspective.
‘Third Round’: power against progression (from the 1920s)
Opposing the revived expectations of the turn of the century, the moral crisis of modernity took astounding proportions after the horrors of World War I, the labour revolutions, and the unjust peace treaties. The collaboration of the intuitive romanticism and empirical realism in literature and fine arts laid the ground for the ‘grand solution’. The natural sciences - attempting to break from the accusation of being ‘conscienceless’ – and the power-striving religious approach joined forces (i.e. Wittgenstein, G. E. Moore) against the raw and utopian demanders of ‘progression’ (i.e. Marxism, Anarchism). Empiricism and religiousness simultaneously attacked the logical analysis of values and historicalism. By referring to an elusive intuition, they demanded sensual data based verification, unequivocal language, natural scientific quantification, and exact mathematic functions in social and human sciences (i.e. the neopositivism of the Vienna Circle). The descriptive and non-explanative, noncritical ‘neutrality’ and ‘objectiveness’ became the synonyms of ‘scientificness’. They offered the distinction of ‘scientificness’ virtually in return for ultimately closing all philosophical problems, research and progress. The social and human sciences were defending criticism by clinging onto humanism (i.e. Frankfurt School).
‘Fourth Round’: the division of social sciences (from the 1970s)
The sizzling hell of World War II and the chilling absurdity of the Cold War provided a continuous supply to the critical approach. In relation to the nuclear bomb, the critical approach has surfaced even in the natural sciences. In turn, the super powers supported critics towards their enemies by all possible means. Because of the global power games the state/military interest towards social and human sciences was grown and eventually these fields also occupied a significant part in the modern institutions. The approach of continuous progress and criticism, however, did not break through because the state/militaristic power colonized social and human sciences. Simultaneously with the initially rebellious rock generation’s employment, family-establishing, and mass submission, the descriptive social sciences that gave up criticism were strengthened by means of finance and science-constitution and for the loss of the explanatory and critical social sciences. According to the postmodern approach that was initiated simultaneously from technical and human fields in the 1970s, ‘progress’ happens without ‘progression’. Criticism’s cultural foundations have been ruined and its rejection was made fashionable (‘trendy’). The dephilosophization of ‘scientific philosophy’ produces ‘scientific theory’ in the universities which no longer discusses the historical, political, and moral aspects of scientificness.
The most popular questions of scientific philosophy (‘scientific theory’)
What is the basis of reliable knowledge? Experience or logics?
(Empiricism – Rationalism debate)
Kant pointed out the indispensability of both. The meaning presupposes an articulation’s logical relationship with other articulations and its reference to a certain set of experiences.
Which is the reliable method? Induction or deduction?
Empirical inductive method (induction): universal abstracted from individual
Axiomatic deductive method (deduction): individual abstracted from universal
Induction is necessary for description. Deduction is necessary for systemization.
Every scientific concept highlights a feature (describes) and puts it into a system (systemize). Both methods are inevitable.
What is the relation between facts and values?
Fact: connection of data based on values, a value-function data-function.
Every factual statement has value statement and every value statement has factual statement.
What is verification?
‘Verification’ according to the Vienna Circle (i.e. Rudolf Carnap /1891 – 1970/) is: backtracing a statement to factual statements that can be verified by experience. Karl Popper (1902 – 1994) says ‘falsification’ is when a falsifiable statement’s nonfalsification (not-being-falsified-ness) strengthens the statement. Being theoretically unfalsifiable is being unscientific.
How does science evolve?
Thomas Kuhn says (1922 – 1996) the scientific thought is dominated by paradigms (world views, fundamental questions). There are always exceptional experiences (anomalies) to which the actual paradigm cannot provide explanation, but these are not disturbing as long as the following of the paradigm brings more success than failure. This standard approach is replaced by a crisis, when the number of failures grow too big and there is no solution yet. This crisis is then followed by a scientific revolution when the new paradigm emerges. The scientific opinion initially rejects it, but it eventually becomes popular by the success from following it. A new standard approach takes shape based on the new paradigm.
What can ‘scientificness’ be measured by?
Not being able to quantify (‘scientify’) exactly the scientific quality has long been disturbing the natural scientific views. Therefore it made a worldwide qualifying system obligatory, which allows every uneducated or unintelligent person (provided he/she can still add) to be able to determine if a scientist is a genius or absolutely useless. Whoever is the most spoken about is the ‘smartest’ of all. No kidding.
(Empiricism – Rationalism debate)
Kant pointed out the indispensability of both. The meaning presupposes an articulation’s logical relationship with other articulations and its reference to a certain set of experiences.
Which is the reliable method? Induction or deduction?
Empirical inductive method (induction): universal abstracted from individual
Axiomatic deductive method (deduction): individual abstracted from universal
Induction is necessary for description. Deduction is necessary for systemization.
Every scientific concept highlights a feature (describes) and puts it into a system (systemize). Both methods are inevitable.
What is the relation between facts and values?
Fact: connection of data based on values, a value-function data-function.
Every factual statement has value statement and every value statement has factual statement.
What is verification?
‘Verification’ according to the Vienna Circle (i.e. Rudolf Carnap /1891 – 1970/) is: backtracing a statement to factual statements that can be verified by experience. Karl Popper (1902 – 1994) says ‘falsification’ is when a falsifiable statement’s nonfalsification (not-being-falsified-ness) strengthens the statement. Being theoretically unfalsifiable is being unscientific.
How does science evolve?
Thomas Kuhn says (1922 – 1996) the scientific thought is dominated by paradigms (world views, fundamental questions). There are always exceptional experiences (anomalies) to which the actual paradigm cannot provide explanation, but these are not disturbing as long as the following of the paradigm brings more success than failure. This standard approach is replaced by a crisis, when the number of failures grow too big and there is no solution yet. This crisis is then followed by a scientific revolution when the new paradigm emerges. The scientific opinion initially rejects it, but it eventually becomes popular by the success from following it. A new standard approach takes shape based on the new paradigm.
What can ‘scientificness’ be measured by?
Not being able to quantify (‘scientify’) exactly the scientific quality has long been disturbing the natural scientific views. Therefore it made a worldwide qualifying system obligatory, which allows every uneducated or unintelligent person (provided he/she can still add) to be able to determine if a scientist is a genius or absolutely useless. Whoever is the most spoken about is the ‘smartest’ of all. No kidding.
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